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ER

Internal Discussion

1. DCI ✓
2. DDCI ✓
3. ExDir ✓
4. DDI ✓
5. GC ✓
6. [redacted]
7. ClSecom ✓
8. DDA ✓
9. ES ✓
10. ER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (U)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Chairman, SECOM 1225 Ames		SECOM-D-062
		DATE 7 March 1986

STAT

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DD/ICS 6S01				STAT
2.				
3. D/ICS				
4.	21			
5. DDCI 7E12 Hqs (copy)				
6.				
7. DCI	21 Mar			Original held by DCI
8.				
9. ER		16 May		
10.				
11.				
12. SECOM 1225 Ames				
13.				
14.				
15.				

S-111-JR

FORM 1-79 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GPO : 1983 O - 411-632

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-062

7 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [redacted]
Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (U)

1. Action Requested: Advice and comments by addressees on the attached independent assessment of SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center. (FOUO)

2. Background: The DCI authorized establishment within SECOM of an Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (UDAC) to compile information and to analyze leaks of classified intelligence. The UDAC began operation in October 1984. To support a review of the direction and focus of the overall UDAC function and operation, I requested the CIA Directorate of Intelligence to provide an experienced analyst to do an in-depth critique and assessment. The result was the attached perceptive analysis of the UDAC operation. The first chief of the UDAC is being reassigned to the FBI. The arrival of his successor provides a logical occasion to consider the need for any changes in operation or structure of the UDAC. (C)

3. Recommendation: That addressees note the attached assessment and provide such comments and guidance as they deem appropriate on its findings and recommendations. (U)

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Attachment: a/s

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Separated From Attachment

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21 February 1986

Executive Summary

Purpose

The Chairman of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) is currently reviewing the direction and focus of the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (UDAC) program on leaks. He requested that CIA's Directorate of Intelligence provide assistance in obtaining an independent analytical critique of UDAC's mission and role. This is a summary of a study by [redacted] of the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support in the DI that provides a critical look at the mission and role of the UDAC and suggests ways to improve its operations. (C/NF) 25X1

Background

The Intelligence Community has met with little success in its efforts to stop the increasing number of leaks--unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information--to the media. It is easy to understand why when the reasons for this are examined: senior officials in the Executive Branch and Congress exhibit ambivalent attitudes toward leaks; the media are eager to promote public debate, even at the expense of national security; policy-level officials use leaks to try to manipulate the media for a variety of reasons; the leak process has become a valued, accepted, ingrained, even expected, and virtually risk-free tool for doing business in the nation's capital; and the Intelligence Community's approach to solving this problem, although it has slightly improved over the past several years, fails to educate US leadership and intelligence consumers to the seriousness of the damage done by leaks, remains somewhat fragmented and reflexive, lacks uniformity of procedure and purpose, and needs additional tools and personnel. (C/NF)

In a major step to improve the Intelligence Community's approach to the leak problem, the DCI authorized the SECOM to establish the UDAC. The UDAC functions as a repository for leak information and analysis, as a focal point for direct support to the DCI and the chairman of SECOM, and for liaison with the FBI and leak investigation units in the Intelligence Community. (C/NF)

Conclusion

SECOM and UDAC have made some progress in attacking the leak problem by creating the first Intelligence Community unauthorized disclosure register (data base) from which analytical work can be undertaken. Moreover, they have generally applied their resources in an effective and efficient manner. In

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general, the UDAC appears to be performing about as well as can be expected, given their level of resources and the absence of authoritative Community-wide standards for dealing with unauthorized disclosures. (S/NF)

Nevertheless, there are four areas central to the SECOM/UDAC mission that must be developed more fully and effectively if the UDAC is to reach a greater potential to guide and assist the Intelligence Community in developing and implementing a credible program for combating unauthorized disclosures. These areas are:

-- Development of a dynamic liaison program to improve relations with Community components.

-- Achievement of greater uniformity of Community effort against unauthorized disclosures.

-- Publication of a formalized, comprehensive, and broadly disseminated monthly report on the major aspects of the leak problem.

-- Development of an education program to raise security awareness, particularly among intelligence consumers at senior and policy levels. (C/NF)

Although UDAC's track record suggests strongly it has a clear understanding of the initiatives needed to allow the development of these four areas, unfortunately, it neither has the personnel nor the authority needed for these tasks. Without such tools, Intelligence Community leadership should not expect the UDAC to do much more than continue to function in a rather passive mode as an unauthorized disclosure register for the Intelligence Community. (S/NF)

Recommendations

-- To test the thoroughness of their current detection effort and to ensure the validity of their analysis, the UDAC should consider expanding--at least temporarily--the scope of its effort to detect and collect data on leaks by using the services of a comprehensive, automated data base system such as NEXIS or Dialog. (S/NF)

-- SECOM and UDAC should develop a staffing proposal specifying the number, rank, qualifications, and duties of additional personnel (probably two or three midlevel officers) needed to enable the UDAC to function more effectively. If the Congressionally imposed personnel ceiling on the Intelligence Community Staff precludes additional personnel for the UDAC, serious consideration should be given to transferring the UDAC and, perhaps the SECOM, to an organization free of this constraint. (C/NF)

-- The UDAC should reorder its priorities to develop a stronger liaison program. UDAC should make every effort to meet regularly with

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Community representatives, and should lead and encourage efforts aimed at overcoming the Intelligence Community's fragmented approach to the leak problem. (C/NF)

-- Clear guidelines are needed to establish minimum standards of performance for the primary aspects of the Intelligence Community's effort against unauthorized disclosures. Specifically, the SECOM--assisted by the UDAC and the Unauthorized Disclosure Investigation Subcommittee--should prepare for the DCI's signature a comprehensive directive to all Community members establishing the UDAC as the focal point for unauthorized disclosures of intelligence. The directive should also require that the members provide full support and cooperation to the UDAC. It should also establish firm guidelines governing the practices and procedures applied by the members to the detection, reporting, investigation, and disposition of cases of unauthorized disclosure. (S/NF)

-- The UDAC should consider a major expansion of its monthly report to reflect more complete and comprehension coverage of unauthorized disclosures. The intent should be to provide the DCI and other readers with a single publication containing relevant information on the major aspects of unauthorized disclosure, to include information on Congressional, Judicial, and Executive Branch initiatives and moods, damage quantification, updates on the status of important cases, and special analysis on leak patterns and activities. The dissemination of the revised report should be expanded. (S/NF)

-- The SECOM should consider whether it should help foster development of and provide guidance and direction to a Community-sponsored education program for consumers of intelligence. If so, the UDAC--perhaps in conjunction with one or more SECOM subcommittees--could serve as a mechanism for this purpose. The education program, intended for all intelligence consumers, should be targeted primarily toward senior consumers at the policy level. It would help to limit the frequency of leaks by raising the awareness of potential leakers to the extent and nature of the damage caused by leaks to national security interests. (C/NF)

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21 February 1986

PREFACE

The DCI Security Committee (SECOM) has directed one of its components, the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (UDAC), to assess recent data on unauthorized disclosures and to update the 1984 SECOM study on leaks of intelligence information within the next year or so. The chairman of SECOM who is currently reviewing the direction and focus of the overall UDAC program on unauthorized disclosure requested that CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) provide assistance in obtaining an independent analytical critique of the UDAC role and its mission. This paper was prepared by [redacted] of the Current Production and Analytic Support Office in the DI and represents the result of that effort. (S/NF)

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SCOPE NOTE

This provides a critical look at the mission and role of the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center and suggests ways to improve its methods and procedures. Except for the last segment on education, it does not deal with or provide answers to the larger question of how to prevent or minimize leaks to the media. (U)

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Background

The problem of leaks--unauthorized disclosures of intelligence material to the media--is not new. It has confronted and confounded Presidents and intelligence organizations in this country since the days of George Washington. Executive Branch, Congressional, and Intelligence Community officials for many years have often and loudly bemoaned their individual and collective inability to stop them. Harry Truman during a 1951 press conference said: "Whether it be treason or not, it does the United States just as much damage for its military secrets to be made known to an enemy through open publication as for them to be given to an enemy through the clandestine operation of spies." Years later Allen Dulles in The Craft of Intelligence wrote: "I have to admit, and do so with a mixture of regret and sadness, that during my years of service in the CIA I did not succeed in making much progress in this field. I did not find an acceptable and workable formula for tightening up our governmental machinery or slowing down the tempo of frustrating leaks of sensitive information of value to a potential enemy." (U)

The fact that the number and frequency of the leaks is continuing to escalate is of major concern today to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence. The leak problem is especially compounded by ambivalent attitudes of some senior officials in government, by a hostile press that is eager to promote public debate even at the expense of national security, and by the increasing propensity of policy-level officials and staffers to leak intelligence information to manipulate the media for their own purposes. In a sense, many of these senior officials are competing for resources and attention. [redacted] Chairman of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM), recently summed up the disclosure dilemma with these words: "On the one hand, leaks foreclose the options of policymakers and/or jeopardize the national security. On the other hand, a well-placed leak can be used to enhance greatly the image of the leaker, his programs and policies, or to seriously discredit his adversaries, or their programs and policies. The leak is a two-edged sword, not easily surrendered by those in a position to influence policy and public opinion." (U) 25X1

Max Frankel, the Washington Bureau Chief for The New York Times during the Pentagon Papers Case, wrote: "Practically everything that our government does, plans, thinks, hears, and contemplates in the realm of foreign policy is stamped and treated as secret and then unraveled by that same government, by the Congress, and by the press in one continuing round of professional and social contacts and cooperative and competitive exchanges of information. The governmental, political, and personal interests of the participants are inseparable in this process. Presidents make secret decisions, only to reveal them for the purpose of frightening an adversary nation, fooling a friendly electorate, or protecting their reputations. The military services conduct secret research in weaponry, only to reveal it for the purpose of enhancing their budgets, appearing superior or inferior to a foreign army, or gaining the vote of a congressman or the favor of a contractor. The Navy uses secret information to run down the weaponry of the Air Force. The Army passes on secret information to prove its superiority to the Marine Corps. High

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officials of the government reveal secrets in the search for support of their policy to help sabotage the plans and policies of rival departments. Middle-rank officials of government reveal secrets so as to attract the attention of their superiors or to lobby against the orders of their superiors. Though not the only vehicle for this traffic in secrets, the Congress is always eager to provide a forum, and the press is probably the most important." (U)

While Max Frankel's words are overstated and somewhat self-serving of the press, they, nevertheless, contain more than a kernel of truth. They also serve well to illustrate just how pervasive and ingrained the leak process is in the US system of government. In fact, disclosures are today more than ever a normal and expected part of the process of policy formulation and conduct. Moreover, it is accurate to say that the government is actively springing leaks with one hand while trying to plug them with the other. (U)

In an attempt to deal with the problem of intelligence leaks, the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) was designated the office of responsibility and record for unauthorized disclosures in 1959. SECOM, in support of the DCI and in conjunction with components of the Intelligence Community, has sought repeatedly to enlist the aid of the Executive Branch and the Congress in combating the leak problem. Although their appeals were heard by sympathetic, high-level audiences, little in the way of practical, remedial measures were ever developed. Moreover, antileak measures promulgated by the Executive Branch have either been weak, canceled, or adulterated to the point of ineffectiveness. Finally, the number, frequency, and seriousness of leaks has increased dramatically over the past several years. (U)

It is clear that the Intelligence Community has met with little success in its efforts to stop leaks. When the reasons for this are examined, it is not difficult to understand why. Senior officials at the highest levels of the Executive Branch and Congress frequently display ambivalent attitudes about leaks. The leak process has become a valued, accepted, ingrained, and virtually risk-free tool for doing business in the nation's capitol. And, although the Intelligence Community's approach to solving this problem has marginally improved in the past several years, it fails, nevertheless, to educate US leaders to the seriousness of the damage done by leaks, remains somewhat fragmented and reflexive, lacks uniformity of procedure and purpose, and needs additional tools and personnel. (U)

Realizing that the Intelligence Community could do something concrete about some of the reasons cited, SECOM's current chairman, in accordance with DCI policy directives, has led an effort to resolve many of the problems hamstringing the Intelligence Community's approach to the problem.

As an initial step, SECOM commissioned and published a major study that carefully examined the data available to the Intelligence Community on the number and nature of leaks of classified intelligence information through the media. The study described the procedures and methodology used to assemble and assess data on leaks, examined and presented the data from a number of perspectives, and reported major conclusions and recommendations. The study

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was published and presented to the DCI and the Intelligence Community in mid-1984[1]. In addition, the chairman of the SECOM over the past three years has conducted a security education program on unauthorized disclosures. This program has been made available to Department of Justice attorneys, various contractors, certain congressional staffs, and senior staffs of the Army, DIA, and NSA. (S/NF)

Acting on a recommendation derived from the study, the DCI authorized SECOM to establish an Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (UDAC) for the compilation and analysis of leaks of classified intelligence information to the media. The creation of the Center to quantify and qualify the leak problem was based on the realization that the assembly of a comprehensive data base on leaks is essential to the fight against unauthorized disclosure. The center, established in October 1984, works to quantify the number of times specific types of intelligence information have been published and likely sources of such leaks. The intent of the effort is to provide the kinds of statistical data on leaks necessary to convey convincingly to US leadership the extent to which leaks are jeopardizing national security interests. (S/NF)

UDAC Mission and Role

The UDAC is a central repository for information and analysis on unauthorized disclosure for those in the Intelligence Community charged with the investigation of leaks of classified intelligence to the news media. It also serves as a focal point for direct support to the DCI, the chairman of SECOM, and for liaison with the FBI and the leak investigation units in the Community. Neither the SECOM nor the UDAC has the personnel or the expertise to conduct meaningful damage assessments. Thus, the UDAC is dependent upon the gross estimate of damage provided by components of the Intelligence Community. The UDAC has no unilateral investigative powers. Its data collection procedure is separate from the investigative/legal process that uses UDAC data to pursue leak investigation and to lobby Congress and the Department of Justice for legislation and enforcement. (S/NF)

The UDAC assembles for ready retrieval basic data regarding unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information to the media. It helps to reduce redundant research and investigative effort by components of the Intelligence Community. The UDAC determines whether disclosures are new or simply restatements of previous leaks and which of the new disclosures are the most damaging and deserving of investigation. The UDAC also serves as a data source for Intelligence Community components conducting security awareness programs and, where possible, attempts to develop educational materials, including sanitized case histories, for Intelligence Community use. (S/NF)

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[1] DCI Security Committee Survey of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Intelligence FY1979-FY1983 (U)

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UDAC's principal means of acquiring information from the Intelligence Community on leaks is through a questionnaire that records all known essential elements of information on a given disclosure. This questionnaire, which had its origin in SECOM's major 1984 study on leaks, provided a standardized recordkeeping system on unauthorized disclosures for the first time. Completed questionnaires are generated by elements of the Intelligence Community and by the UDAC staff when a disclosure is identified. The information taken from the questionnaires is coded and transferred by the UDAC staff to a computer where it forms the bulk of the UDAC unauthorized disclosure register (data base). (S/NF)

Although current procedures detect most unauthorized disclosures in some major publications such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week and Space Technology, and on television news programs, they do not purport to detect leaks carried by the wire services or in many other magazines and newspapers. Although Intelligence Community members may spot and report some leaks of intelligence information on a fortuitous basis, there may be a substantial number of leaks that remain undetected. If so, the validity of UDAC's statistical analysis and case totals would be degraded. (S/NF)

Daily Routine

The UDAC staff scans on a daily basis the media highlights, press summaries, and a small number of newspapers for items that appear to contain unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. If after two days UDAC has not received a completed questionnaire from one or more Intelligence Community components on an apparent leak, the UDAC staff contacts the department or agency with the principal interest in the information and asks if the apparent leak is an unauthorized disclosure. If the information represents an unauthorized disclosure, the UDAC asks the responsible department or agency to immediately forward a completed questionnaire. When the cognizant organization does not know whether the item represents an unauthorized disclosure, UDAC asks for a determination and requests a report within two days. (S/NF)

Leak data from the questionnaire can be compared with data on leaks with similar essential elements of information already on file. The results of the data comparisons and any subsequent analysis are provided by UDAC to the agency or department responsible for the security of the leaked material and to other Intelligence Community components as appropriate. The UDAC provides a monthly report on its findings and activities to the DCI. In these reports, UDAC strives to keep the recipient aware of the scope and nature of the leak problem. (S/NF)

Staff

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[redacted] The special agent functions as chief and principal action officer of the UDAC. He is expected to engage in effective liaison with security officers, leak investigators and focal points, public affairs officers, and other officers and components of the Intelligence Community as appropriate. He serves as adviser to the chairman of SECOM and the Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) and performs research and analysis to determine disclosure patterns, while devising better approaches to leak investigation. In addition, he gathers information on leaks, provides data and analysis to departments and agencies, acts as a focal point for Community coordination, and produces periodic reports for senior management on the nature and scope of the leak problem. He is assisted two days a week in this rather broad undertaking by a consultant, who is a retired CIA officer. (S/NF) 25X1

Conclusion

SECOM and UDAC have made some progress in attacking the leak problem by creating the first Intelligence Community unauthorized disclosure register from which analytical work can be undertaken. They have also made repeated attempts through requests and persuasion--lacking authority to direct actions--to instill a sense of uniformity of purpose and procedure in what traditionally has been a chaotic and fragmented approach by the Intelligence Community to dealing with the disclosure problem. Moreover, they have applied limited resources in an effective and efficient manner to an extraordinarily complex problem that is increasingly damaging to our national security interests. In general, UDAC is performing as well as can be expected, given their level of resources and the absence of authoritative Community-wide standards for dealing with unauthorized disclosures. (S/NF)

Nevertheless, there are four areas central to the SECOM/UDAC mission that must be developed more fully and effectively if the UDAC is to reach a greater potential to guide and assist the Intelligence Community in developing and implementing a credible program for combating unauthorized disclosure. These areas are:

-- Development of a dynamic liaison program to improve relations with Community components.

-- Achievement of greater uniformity of Community effort against unauthorized disclosures.

-- Publication of a formalized, comprehensive, and broadly disseminated monthly report on all major aspects of the leak problem.

-- Development of an education program to raise security awareness, particularly among intelligence consumers at senior and policy levels. (S/NF)

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Although UDAC's track record suggests strongly it has a clear understanding and appreciation of the measures and initiatives needed to allow the development of these four areas, unfortunately, it neither has the personnel nor the authority needed for these tasks. Without such tools, Community leadership should not expect the UDAC to do much more than to continue to function in a rather passive mode as a data base on unauthorized disclosures for the Intelligence Community. (S/NF).

Recommendations

To test the thoroughness of their current detection effort and to ensure the validity of their analysis, the UDAC should consider expanding--at least temporarily--the scope of its effort to detect and collect data on leaks. One way to accomplish this is to use the services of a comprehensive, automated data base system such as NEXIS or Dialog. Arrangements establishing the length of the trial run and the appropriate search statement parameters can be developed easily in conjunction with a representative from CIA's Office of Central Reference. (S/NF)

SECOM and UDAC should develop a staffing proposal specifying the number, rank, qualifications, and duties of additional personnel (probably two or three midlevel officers and appropriate clerical support) needed to enable the UDAC to function more effectively. It is clear that Intelligence Community leadership will have to devote additional resources to the effort if they want to come to grips with the problem. If the Intelligence Community Staff is unable to authorize additional personnel for the UDAC because of Congressionally imposed personnel ceilings, serious consideration should be given to transferring the UDAC and, perhaps the SECOM, to an organization free of this contraint. (S/NF)

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Subsequent sections of this paper deal briefly with the four suggested areas for improvement--liaison, Community support, monthly report, and education. These areas appear to be critical to the success of UDAC or, for that matter, to any organization chartered to deal with the disclosure problem on behalf of the Intelligence Community. (C/NF)

Liaison Program

UDAC's liaison effort is the responsibility of its chief whose myriad duties leave him little time to devote to liaison. He is limited largely to monthly telephone exchanges and infrequent, ad hoc contacts with members of the Intelligence Community. There is almost no likelihood that such a level of liaison activity will enable the UDAC to fully meet its objectives, which include the development and promotion of a uniform, cohesive, and vigorous approach to the leak problem on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Because so many of UDAC's objectives are liaison dependent, it is encouraging to note that even a moderate expansion of the current effort would have immediate and salutary benefits in many of the following essential areas of endeavor:

-- Providing overall program guidance and direction, acting as a central focal point and information exchange, and identifying and assigning priorities to Intelligence Community objectives.

-- Providing overall coordination of investigative efforts, identifying new and useful investigative techniques, establishing reporting and investigative standards of performance, and ensuring the completeness and accuracy of data received from the Intelligence Community.

-- Ensuring that the Intelligence Community consistently and accurately quantifies the level of leak damage. (Because it is often difficult to determine the extent of damage, this critical factor is often neglected.)

-- Establishing an effective relationship between the UDAC and the Unauthorized Disclosure Investigation Subcommittee (UDIS) and leading the effort to increase the "awareness" of intelligence producers and consumers to the nature and extent of leak damage. (S/NF)

Recommendation

Consideration should be given to reordering the priorities in UDAC to develop a stronger liaison program. In carrying out expanded liaison duties, UDAC's representative should make every effort to meet regularly with the chief investigative and focal point officers from Intelligence Community components. UDAC should strive consistently to lead and encourage efforts aimed at overcoming the Intelligence Community's fragmented approach to the leak problem. To accomplish this, the UDAC should demonstrate convincingly

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that it can provide services of common concern--leak data, task coordination, and information exchange--that the components of the Intelligence Community individually cannot offer. (S/NF)

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Community Support

The role of the Intelligence Community in combating unauthorized disclosure has been described by many as fragmented and reflexive. In fact, it was not until the UDAC was established in 1984 that a mechanism designed to foster a more uniform approach to the problem was available to the Intelligence Community. (C/NF)

A major impediment to greater cooperation among the members of the Intelligence Community has been the tendency toward independent actions. Such a situation is not surprising, considering the great diversity in goals and levels of influence among Intelligence Community members. (C/NF)

Fundamental to the fragmented approach to the disclosure problem is the fact that there is no authoritative directive establishing Community-wide norms for dealing with all major aspects of unauthorized disclosure. Steps have not been taken to ensure that components adopt a uniform and cohesive approach to detecting, reporting, investigating, and combating unauthorized disclosure. This apparent lack of resolve could be interpreted as a conscious decision not to devote resources to what may be perceived as a no-win situation. (C/NF)

Several major shortcomings in investigative procedures described in an unpublished chapter of the 1984 study on unauthorized disclosure remain valid:

-- The elements constituting each organization's investigative units are characterized more by diversity than by similarity.

-- Most organizations do not have personnel whose primary mission is leak investigation. Security personnel are often used for this purpose on an ad hoc basis.

-- In most cases, only the organization whose information was leaked will do any investigating. (S/NF)

Also noted in the unpublished chapter is the almost complete absence of formalized cooperation and support among elements of the Intelligence Community on leak investigation and follow through. In general, it notes that:

-- Organizations investigating leaks of their material seldom ask for or receive help or coordination from other users of the leaked information.

-- There is no requirement for an agency upon detecting a leak to report it to the originator of the material.

-- There is no effective mechanism for an organization to formally coordinate its investigation with other organizations except through the FBI and the Department of Justice. (S/NF)

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Other related problem areas impacting on the quality of the Intelligence Community's leak effort and on UDAC's ability to lead and direct that effort include the following:

-- The leak-reporting process is uneven and slow. It often lags because it takes time to determine if a given story actually constitutes a first-time leak.

-- The quality of an investigation and the time required to conclude it vary widely from one organization to another. (S/NF)

Although the UDAC was created to help with these problems, its success has been severely limited by its small staff and lack of authority. As a result, major problem areas hampering the overall effort remain to be resolved. (S/NF)

Recommendation

Clear guidelines are needed to establish minimum standards of performance for the primary aspects of the Intelligence Community's effort against unauthorized disclosure. Specifically, the SECOM--aided by the UDAC and the UDIS--should prepare for the DCI's signature a comprehensive directive to all Community members establishing the UDAC as the focal point for unauthorized disclosure. This directive should require that the members of the Intelligence Community provide full support and cooperation to the UDAC. It should also establish firm guidelines governing the practices and procedures applied by Community members to the detection, reporting, investigation, and disposition of cases of unauthorized disclosure. (S/NF)

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Monthly Report

The UDAC produces a monthly report on unauthorized disclosures for dissemination to the DCI. It is the only publication that compiles information from the entire Community on unauthorized disclosures. The DCI finds the monthly update useful and informative, because, among other things, it provides him with a basis for stimulating support for antileak measures. (C/NF)

The report summarizes relevant information UDAC has received or developed on new cases discovered during the reporting period. For each new case, the report contains a one- or two-sentence brief on the nature of the information leaked, when and in what medium it first appeared, the identity of the reporting agency and its one-word estimate of the damage caused by the leak, and the report date. The last section of the report features a statistical breakout showing by agency the number of cases reported, the number of investigations opened and closed, and the number of cases resolved for the month and year. (C/NF)

The UDAC monthly report uses a fairly narrow, statistical approach designed for quick consumption, but does not cover some important considerations related to leaks. With some additional effort, it could be reconfigured to reflect more complete and comprehensive information on unauthorized disclosures. This could be accomplished by placing greater reliance on a more judicious combination of narrative and statistical data. To meet these considerations, the report would have to be expanded to take into account leak-related topics such as damage quantification, legislation, and reports updating the status of important older cases. Such an improved product could in part be used by the DCI to justify an increased contribution of resources to UDAC by Intelligence Community elements. (S/NF)

Recommendation

The following specific recommendations are for improving UDAC's reporting on unauthorized disclosures.

-- Broaden the dissemination of the monthly report to include agency heads, deputies, and senior principals in the Intelligence Community. Such officials want and need to be kept abreast of major developments in the area of unauthorized disclosure. Privacy considerations may require that two versions be produced for the Community, one for the DCI and selected high-level officials and another for the remaining principals.

-- Add a hard cover to the report. This lends style and credence, setting it aside from "just another memo or report."

-- Strengthen the section on leaks to include the name of the author of the article or TV news segment containing the unauthorized disclosure

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and any attribution he may have made, the name or title of the source document, how many copies were disseminated, and at what levels. On occasion the primary analyst responsible for producing intelligence disclosed in an unauthorized way has a good idea of who might be responsible for the leak. Although conjectural, such information may on occasion merit consideration.

-- Highlight those new cases that are considered especially damaging to national security interests. Considerable effort should be devoted to quantifying in concrete terms the damage caused by the new leaks. (To accomplish the difficult task of quantifying the damage caused by leaks, the UDAC will have to obtain analytical assistance. They could turn to the Denial and Deception Analysis Committee which is responsible for damage assessments or to an analytical organization such as the DI Intelligence Producers Council. Alternatively, the UDAC could be given sufficient personnel to do the job.)

-- Develop a narrative section devoted to updating the status on those cases where the DCI or other principals have a particular interest.

-- Add a section on activities of the Executive Branch, Congress, or the Judiciary that impact on unauthorized disclosure. This section should include reports on the status of pending bills, drafts, directives, decisions, and initiatives. The Office of Congressional Affairs and the Office of General Counsel should be able to provide much of the material for this section.

-- Include a general section for special analysis. One of the major responsibilities of the UDAC is to perform analysis of leaks, looking for discernible patterns of activity; such analysis should be featured. This section could also be used to convey any miscellaneous leak information worthy of mention.

-- Add a historical data chart to round out the monthly report. It would depict by year the total number of leak cases reported and resolved by Intelligence Community components. It would also show by year the total number of cases referred to and resolved by the Department of Justice. (S/NF)

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Education

It is abundantly clear that the media should not be expected to change their attitude toward leaks over the near term. Moreover, it is whimsical to hope that the media will be less inclined to publish classified material. There are no laws charging the media to be responsible in this regard. The media maintain that they cannot be expected to differentiate between what is and what is not classified, and that much of what the public should know is, in any event, routinely and needlessly classified by the government. The media apparently believe they should promote the "public debate" by publishing the material disclosed to it. In some instances, individuals and organizations in the media go so far as to actively ferret out government secrets. It is clear, however, that the media, although culpable in some instances, should not and will not be held responsible for leaks. (U)

To find those responsible for unauthorized disclosures, we have but to look inwardly--usually within the upper echelons at policy levels of the various branches, departments, and agencies of government--for those officials who, for a variety of personal and organizational reasons, provide classified intelligence information to the media. It is the general impression of many security officials involved with combating and investigating leaks that most disclosures come from fairly senior officials, to include career bureaucrats, Congressional staffers, flag officers, political appointees, and members of Congress. More specifically, some security officials apparently are convinced that the sources of much--and certainly the most serious--unauthorized disclosures seem to be centered among congressional staffers, members of Congress, and the nonintelligence agencies of the Executive Branch. (C/NF)

Security officials in the Intelligence Community believe it fair to say that most leakers are consumers of intelligence who know little about the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination process, much less of the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. In fact, they are usually ignorant and insensitive to the money, time, and effort spent on intelligence sources and methods that can be destroyed with a few careless words. Consequently, leakers tend to divulge far more classified information than is necessary to make their point. (C/NF)

The responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the classified intelligence information rests ultimately with the individual who has authorized access to that material. Thus, if the Intelligence Community is to be successful in slowing leaks, the means must be found to elevate the awareness of potential leakers to the damage done by leaks to national security interests and to strip the leak process of its risk-free attractiveness by making leakers accountable for their actions. (U)

Although the Intelligence Community by itself cannot hold most leakers accountable, it does have the potential to be able to raise the awareness of intelligence consumers. Unfortunately, the Intelligence Community does not have an effective program for educating those believed largely responsible for most leaks. In fact, the lack of an effective program, deficiencies in efforts to quantify the damage caused by leaks, and Executive ambivalence on

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holding leakers accountable are major reasons for the ever increasing number of leaks. Thus far, the Intelligence Community has failed in its efforts to convince the Executive Branch, Congress, the courts, the public, and, most especially, its consumers that damage caused by leaks exceeds any positive benefits. (C/NF)

Recommendation

The UDAC--perhaps, in conjunction with other SECOM subcommittees--could serve as a mechanism to foster development of and provide guidance and direction to a Community-sponsored education program for consumers of intelligence. Such an approach may well help to limit the increasing frequency of leaks by raising the awareness of potential leakers to the extent and nature of the damage caused by leaks to national security interests. Such an undertaking would be somewhat extensive, requiring the enlargement of the UDAC staff and the promulgation of appropriate National Security Decision and DCI Directives. The best possible security education program--even one that is tailored specifically for senior officials--will fall short of the mark, however, unless it is accompanied by clear and compelling evidence that leakers will be held accountable for their actions. (C/NF)

Although the program would be directed to all major consumers of intelligence, it would have its greatest impact on those individuals who are new and not already persuaded by the attractiveness of leaks. In fact, maximum effort should be devoted to briefing all newly designated senior officials either before they take office or immediately thereafter. If an official is not briefed promptly, a pattern of poor regard for the value of intelligence data may become established. (C/NF)

The education program would support and reinforce those individuals favorably disposed to the protection of classified information. It would also reach a sizable number of "fence sitters." It is not clear how many of those psychologically predisposed to leak are likely to be swayed. (C/NF)

A program directed toward the education of all consumers of intelligence on unauthorized disclosures should reverse the increasing frequency at which leaks occur, thus limiting the damage to national security interests. To be successful, such a program would have to incorporate the following major features:

-- Require the unequivocal backing of the President and the DCI.

-- Be mandatory for all consumers of intelligence. It must place special emphasis on educating those senior consumers at the policy level.

-- Quantify and emphasize in dramatic fashion the damage done to national security by leaks.

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-- Appeal to an individual's sense of patriotism and civic responsibility.

-- Cover news-gathering techniques, how to deal with the media, and provide reasonable advice and guidance on how precoordination of intelligence material intended for release can reduce damage to intelligence sources and methods.

The content and format of such a program would have to be carefully structured and prepared. Considering the level of the audience, anything less than a first-rate presentation would be disastrous. (C/NF)

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SECOM-D-062 - SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (U)

Prepared by: SECOM [redacted] STAT

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